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Newton on Action at a Distance
S t e f f e N  D u c h e y N e *
Reasoning without experience is very slippery. A man may puzzle me by arguents [sic] . . . but I’le 
beleive my ey experience ↓my eyes.↓ (CUL Add. Ms. 3970, 619r)
1 .  i n t r o d u c t i o n 1
ernan mcmullin once remarked that, although the “avowedly tentative form” of 
the Queries “marks them off from the rest of Newton’s published work,” they are 
“the most significant source, perhaps, for the most general categories of matter and 
action that informed his research.”2 the Queries (or Quaestiones), which Newton 
inserted at the very end of the third book of the Opticks3 or its Latin rendition, 
Optice,4 constitute that part of his optical magnum opus which he reworked and 
augmented the most—especially between 1704 and 1717. While the main text of 
the Opticks itself underwent only minor changes and even fewer additions,5 the 
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l1 I am indebted to the audience of the conference the Reception of Newton, which took place 
at Ghent university from March 12–15, 2012, for encouraging and useful feedback on the presenta-
tion out of which this essay grew. I am very thankful to eric Schliesser, Marius Stan, Steven Nadler, 
and the referees for the JHP for providing highly useful comments. I have studied the draft material 
of the Queries (cuL Add. Ms. 3970) and the so-called “classical Scholia” (Royal Society, Gregory Ms. 
247) during 2008 and 2009 and I am indebted to the Provosts and Syndics of cambridge university 
Library and to the Royal Society, respectively, for permission to quote from the material in their care. 
Once the transcriptions of the draft material of the Queries became freely available online on the 
Newton Project web page, I have compared my own transcriptions to those to be found on http://
www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/NAtP00055. there are minute differences, of 
which the reader should be aware, between my own transcriptions and those provided on the Newton 
Project (http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk). In my own transcriptions, I have not distinguished 
between additions above the line and pieces of text that have been overwritten by new ones: both sorts 
of alterations are indicated with arrows pointing downwards. however, these minute differences do 
not affect the claims made in this paper. Words that are struck through in my transcriptions refer to 
words that were crossed out by Newton in the original text.
2 McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 3.
3 first edition: 1704; second edition: 1717 (reissued in 1718); third edition: 1721; fourth edi-
tion: 1730.
4 first edition: 1706; second edition: 1719.
5 these changes and additions are listed in Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 
180–81n10.
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contrary holds for the Queries. Whereas the Queries in the first edition of the 
Opticks (1704) contained 16 rather short queries or a modest 6 pages of text,6 its 
third edition (1721), of which the text was left untouched in the posthumously 
published edition (1730), contained 31 oftentimes elaborate queries or no less 
than 70 pages of text.7 Such significant proliferation of words surely merits our 
attention. the purpose of these queries, which Newton inserted after having 
pointed out that he had “not finished this part of my Design [i.e. the third book 
of the Opticks, which addressed diffraction, or as Newton called it: ‘inflexion’],” 
was to stimulate “a further search to be made by others.”8 In manuscript material 
composed later, he commented as follows on the purpose of the Queries: “these 
things I only hint as Quæres without asserting any thing.”9 Accordingly, the queries 
that he introduced were only “hints to be examined & improved by the further 
experiments & observations of such as are curious ↓inquisitive↓.”10 In Queries 1 
to 5 in the first edition of the Opticks, he raised a number of questions that were 
related to diffraction. In the remainder of the Queries, he launched questions 
that were related to other domains: Queries 6–11 were related to heat and fire, 
Queries 12, 15, and 16 to visual perception, and Queries 13 and 14 to the analogy 
between sound and color. two years later, in Optice (1706), which was translated 
by Samuel clarke, Newton added 7 additional quaestiones:11 Quaestiones 17 and 18 
dealt with the double refraction of “Island crystal,” Quaestiones 19–22 hinted at 
the plausibility of a corpuscular account of light, and the long concluding Quaestio 
23, that is, the precursor of what would become Query 31 in the final edition of 
the Opticks, addressed the “virtues, powers, or forces [virtutes, potentias, sive vires]” 
by which the particles of bodies act upon one another at a distance (in Latin: per 
interjectum aliquod intervallum).12 In Quaestio 20, he made public his views on the 
gravitational ether for the first time.13 At the same time, he added some theological 
excerpts in which he argued that natural philosophy will lead to “the primary cause 
[i.e. God] itself [ad ipsam . . . Causam primam]” and that it will teach us to worship 
of “our true and most generous Author [verus noster & beneficentissimus Author].”14 
6 Newton, Opticks1, 132–37. After the first book, which ends at page 144, the remainder of the first 
edition of the Opticks is repaginated anew. here I have followed the original repagination.
7 Newton, Opticks3, 313–82. On queries as a genre within Newton’s natural philosophy, see Anstey, 
“Methodological Origins.”
8 Newton, Opticks3, 132. On Newton’s study of diffraction and the problems surrounding it, see 
e.g. Shapiro, “Skating on the edge.”
9 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 235v [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)]. 
10 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 242r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
11 Newton, Optice1, 299–348.
12 Newton, Optice1, 322.
13 Newton, Optice1, 309–14. useful information on Newton’s gravitational ether is to be found in 
Guerlac, “Newton’s Optical Aether” and Rosenfeld, “Newton’s Views on Aether and Gravitation.” the 
former is still relevant for getting a grasp on the history of the Queries; the latter is still highly useful 
for its technical characterizations of Newton’s ethers (Rosenfeld, “Newton’s Views on Aether and Grav-
itation,” esp. 30, 31–32, 35). On Newton’s ethers, see, furthermore, Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius.
14 Newton, Optice1, 314 [Quaestio 20, i.e. the precursor of Query 28 in the final edition] and 348 
[Quaestio 23, i.e. the precursor of Query 31 in the final edition]. In an intended, but never published, 
preface to the first edition of the Opticks, Newton had included a short theological paragraph (McGuire, 
“‘Principles of Philosophy,’” 183; cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 479r).
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Now, at this point, the Queries or Quaestiones began to serve a dual purpose: on the 
one hand, they continued to put, in the spirit of the Queries of the first edition 
of the Opticks, certain topics on the agenda of future experimental-philosophical 
investigation; at the same time, however, they served the theological agenda which 
he cherished and gradually sought to make public after the appearance of the 
first edition of the Opticks. In the 1717 edition of the Opticks, which was reissued 
a year later, he inserted eight extra queries between what had been Quaestiones 
16 and 17 in Optice (1706),15 and, additionally, he extended Queries 8, 11, 16, 
and 31.16 Queries 17–24 in Opticks (1717–18) discussed different sorts of ethers 
(the optical ether, the gravitational ether, and the ether potentially involved in 
acts of perception or volition).17 Later editions of the Opticks (1721; 1730) and 
Optice (1719) contained only minor changes, which do not at all affect the thesis 
that I seek to defend: namely, that from the 1706 edition of Optice and onward 
the Queries or Quaestiones served not only Newton’s endeavor to stimulate future 
inquiry, but that, at the same time, the Queries or Quaestiones began to serve his 
theological agenda as well.18
In this paper my aim is not to dwell on all changes in the successive editions of 
the Queries (or Quaestiones). Rather, my aim is to account for certain, not very well-
understood and appreciated fragments in the Queries/Quaestiones of the Opticks/
Optice and to call attention to their corresponding draft material, which, as we will 
see, shed light on Newton’s much debated views on action at a distance. On the 
basis of these sources, I put his views on action at a distance in a new perspective 
and provide them with what I believe to be an adequate account. Secondly, I argue 
that the simultaneous introduction of the ether speculations and the theological 
sections was not at all incidental, but that, from Newton’s perspective, both were 
in fact closely interconnected. Moreover, I explain that with the words ‘[a]nd 
to shew that I do not take Gravity for an essential Property of Bodies, I have added one 
Question concerning its Cause, chusing to propose it by way of a Question, because I am not 
yet satisfied about it for want of Experiments’ he implicitly hinted at this connection in 
the advertisement to the 1717 edition of the Opticks.19
Let me provide an overview of this paper. In the second section, I briefly take 
stock of the current scholarly proposals regarding Newton’s views on action at a 
distance. In the third and most important section, I argue for an interpretative 
alternative that is, as I attempt to argue, explanatorily superior to past and currently 
15 Newton, Opticks2, 322–28.
16 Newton, Opticks2, 314–16 [Query 8], 318–19 [Query 11], 322 [Query 16], and 365–69, 375, 
377, and 379 [Query 31].
17 Newton, Opticks2, 322–28.
18 here I should call the reader’s attention to Snobelen’s detailed work on the theological dimen-
sions of the Queries to the Opticks (Snobelen, “‘La luz de la Naturaleza’”). Snobelen is preparing an 
english rendition of this paper, currently entitled “‘the Light of Nature,’” which he has so kindly 
allowed me to consult. Since I am concerned only with Newton’s theology insofar as it is relevant 
to his views on action at a distance, I will refrain here from treating the theological contents of the 
Queries in their own right. Additionally, McGuire’s and Dobbs’s writings provide excellent guidance 
in contextualizing the theological dimensions of the Queries (McGuire, “Invisible Realm” and Dobbs, 
The Janus Faces of Genius, 207–9, 220–30).
19 Newton, Opticks4, cxxiii; italics in original.
678 journal of the history of philosophy 52:4  october 2014
available proposals. I shall reflect on the broader implications of my claims in the 
fourth section.
2 .  t a k i n g  s t o c k  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o p o s a l s
Providing an adequate account of Newton’s views on action at a distance has 
turned out to be a longstanding issue in Newton scholarship. Recently, action at 
a distance became the subject of renewed historical and philosophical reflection 
in a series of publications by John henry,20 Andrew Janiak,21 hylarie Kochiras,22 
eric Schliesser,23 and myself.24 the discussion centers around three interrelated 
issues: (i) the interpretation and context of Newton’s 1692/93 letter to Bentley, 
(ii) the significance of the “active principles” vis-à-vis the passivity of matter, and 
(iii) Newton’s views on action at a distance in the Queries. each of the above 
scholars has each in their own way contributed to progress on the issue at stake. 
however, no consensus has emerged. In this paper, I offer some arguments in 
favor of an alternative reading that I shall spell out and defend in the third section 
of this essay. Before I do so, I provide an overview of the proposals that have been 
put on the table thus far. Since my primary aim in this section is only to chart 
the accounts that are currently available and to present them in a succinct way, 
I shall not be criticizing them in this section. I will do so in section 3, in which I 
also argue for my own proposal.
Janiak argues that Newton rejected robust action at a distance in his famous 
letter to Richard Bentley on 25 february 1692/93, because he “held the familiar 
view that a substance cannot act where it is not” and because he “considered any 
non-local action to be simply ‘inconceivable.’”25 to be clear from the outset, 
robust action at a distance occurs when spatially separated bodies impress a force 
on one another, that is, when they, according to the definition of vis impressa in 
the Principia, change one another’s inertial state without an intervening material 
or immaterial substance between them.26 As I will argue, Newton rejected an 
intervening material substance while endorsing an immaterial one. According 
to Janiak, Newton’s denial that “gravity could be essential to matter does not 
itself foreclose the possibility that material bodies might exhibit distant action.” 
Rather, he connected his denial of action at a distance with God’s “potential role 
as a medium for all gravitational interaction”—only then, Janiak urges, “can we 
decisively rule out the notion that bodies can exhibit action at a distance.”27 As 
Janiak explains the matter, 
20 henry, “‘Pray do not ascribe that notion to me’”; henry, “Isaac Newton y el Problema”; and 
henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione.”
21 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher.
22 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem”; and Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause 
and Substance counting.”
23 Schliesser, “Newton’s Substance Monism.”
24 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 37–45; and Ducheyne, “Newton on Action 
at a Distance.”
25 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35 and 77, respectively; cf. 39–40.
26 for Newton’s definition of impressed force, see Newton, The Principia, 405. 
27 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35 and 40.
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Since God is not distant from any object at any time, and since Newton obviously 
thinks that God might be the very “immaterial medium” underlying all gravitational 
interactions among material bodies, it seems clear that when Newton contemplates 
the idea that God might be the relevant mediating element he is not contemplating 
the idea that bodies act at a distance on one another. Instead, God acts locally and 
directly on any object at any time.28
Kochiras has correctly argued that Janiak’s explanation for Newton’s rejection 
of action at a distance in terms of God’s ubiquity is problematic because it fails 
to accommodate Newton’s insistence on secondary causation when it comes to 
the cause of gravity.29 Although she essentially agrees with Janiak’s reading of 
Newton’s 1692/93 letter to Bentley,30 Kochiras considers Janiak’s position too 
strong. Kochiras argues instead that Newton was inclined to reject robust action 
at a distance because he appeared to endorse the metaphysical principle that 
“matter cannot act where it is not.”31 When he speculated on the cause of gravity, 
he tended—in line with his belief that all causation is local—to give priority to 
the hypothesis of an immaterial medium.32 Although in Query 31 he appears 
to rely on robust action at a distance, “he soon undercuts that appearance, by 
denying knowledge of how those forces operate and noting that the attractions 
might by performed by impulse, or by some other, unfamiliar means.”33 Instead, 
he “expects something to mediate between the bodies and to mediate spatially,” 
instead of “attributing attractive powers directly to material bodies.”34 however, 
at the same time, Kochiras urges that “[w]hile Newton was clearly drawn to a 
belief in local causation, I see the aether of Query 21 [which is composed of 
minute particles with strong inter-particulate repulsive forces between them] as 
an indication that he considered abandoning it.”35 According to Kochiras, the 
28 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 39; my italics.
29 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 270[b]–72[a]. I agree with this 
particular criticism of Janiak’s position, and I shall return to it. As I will explain, Newton conceived of 
the active principles in the Queries to the Opticks as secondary causes, i.e. as God’s agents (pace Janiak 
and hesse, Forces and Fields, 152).
30 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 268[a]; and Kochiras, “Gravity’s 
cause and Substance counting,” 178[a]–80[a].
31 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 275[a].
32 Kochiras emphasizes that although Newton’s attitude toward the above principle was “one of 
inclination rather than commitment,” this inclination nevertheless has its effect: “It pulls Newton away 
from the hypothesis that matter is able to act robustly and distantly, without any medium” (“Gravity’s 
cause and Substance counting,” 169[a]). Although Newton’s beliefs in the passivity of matter and 
local causation motivated him to search for an immaterial medium, he did not, however, consistently 
pin his hopes on that possibility (169n22). Kochiras, furthermore, argues that the hypothesis of an 
immaterial medium is problematic since it is impossible for Newton to establish it by the empirical 
means which he relied on in the demonstrative part of his experimental philosophy (“Gravity and 
Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 278[a]).
33 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 181[a].
34 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 275[a].
35 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 275n50; and Kochiras, “Gravity’s 
cause and Substance counting,” 173[a]. Kochiras reconstructs Newton’s reasoning here as follows: 
“Once contact action by a dense material medium has been ruled out as inconsistent with observations, 
and once the obstacles to grounding any immaterial medium empirically are considered, unmediated 
distant action by matter looks like the best bet” (“Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 175[a]; my italics).
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ether of Query 21 involves “unmediated distant action by matter.”36 In Kochiras’s 
view, in the Queries to the Opticks he explored two radically different gravitational 
hypotheses: while Query 21 posits robust action at a distance, Query 31 involves 
an immaterial medium, which physically underpins “the attractive and repulsive 
forces operating between spatially separated material bodies.”37 ultimately, in his 
speculative moments he wavered between accepting and rejecting robust action 
at a distance. She also argues, in contrast to henry (see below), that “Newton is 
objecting not only to the notion that gravity is essential to matter, but also to the 
notion of unmediated distant action.”38
Building on his earlier work,39 henry has recently argued that “action at a distance 
wasn’t inconceivable for Newton (because he believed that nothing could stop an omnipotent 
God from bringing it about), and nowhere did he ever say it was.”40 correspondingly, 
Newton’s letter to Bentley “does not say that action at a distance is inconceivable, 
much less that it is impossible. What Newton is trying to do is to make sure that 
what he considers to be the observed reality of action at a distance can be used 
to prove the existence of God (natural proofs of the existence of God are, after 
all, the main theme of the correspondence).”41 therefore his primary goal in the 
aforementioned letter to Bentley was to not to reject robust action at a distance 
but rather to reject epicurean attraction, according to which matter can by its 
own nature affect other pieces of matter without an intermediary.42 According to 
henry, the content of Newton’s Queries, in which Newton frequently discussed 
actions at a distance, indicate that he actually endorsed the possibility of robust 
action at a distance.43 Building further on the work of henry and McMullin,44 I 
have previously argued that although Newton rejected action at a distance at the 
gravitational level, he accepted the possibility of action at a distance on the micro-
level, that is, the level of optical interactions and at the level of his speculations 
36 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 173[a].
37 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 277[b].
38 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 180[a].
39 henry, “‘Pray do not ascribe that notion to me’”; and henry, “Isaac Newton y el Problema.”
40 henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 16[a]; italics in original; cf. 13[a], 14[a], and 15[b].
41 henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 13[a].
42 henry states that “what Newton is really saying to Bentley is that although they (he and Bentley) 
both know gravity is an action at a distance they shouldn’t allow this to be seen as an essential property 
of matter because to do so is to provide a hostage to atheists” (“Gravity and De gravitatione,” 13[a]). A 
similar conclusion was previously reached in Meyerson, Identité et réalite, 412–13.
43 henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 14[a]. Similarly, heimann and McGuire have argued that in 
light of the Queries to the Opticks and especially in light of Query 21 “it is clear that action at a distance 
is a doctrine which never seriously troubled Newton” (“Newtonian forces and Lockean Powers,” 242). 
Another option was taken by cohen, who stated in his “Guide to Newton’s Principia” that according 
to Newton the inter-particular forces of attraction and repulsion are “sufficiently short-range in their 
action . . . that they do not raise a major problem of understanding their mode of action.” On this ac-
count, they do not fall into “the category of the forces acting at a distance” (Newton, The Principia, 61).
44 McMullin argued that the Queries to the Opticks indicate that Newton had no objections to ac-
tion at a distance per se (McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 144n137 and 151n210). he offered 
the following potential explanation for the occurrence of action at a distance in the Queries: “he [i.e. 
Newton] could allow intrinsic activity to the aether more easily than he could to ordinary matter” (99). 
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on the cause of gravity.45 I have now found good reasons to abandon my earlier 
take on the matter and I shall spell out these reasons.
Schliesser, finally, has argued for a totally different interpretation. According 
to him, it is possible that “[i]f attractive agents can be material then for Newton 
matter need not always be passive.”46 Schliesser maintains that one can deny 
that matter has a principle of self-motion, which Newton, according to him, 
denied in his famous 1692/93 letter to Bentley, and still allow that matter can be 
active.47 correspondingly, Schliesser points out that Query 31 allows “as he [i.e. 
Newton] explicitly says in his [fourth] letter to Bentley, that the attractive ‘agent 
be material.’”48 following this line of reasoning, Schliesser claims that Newton’s 
account in A Treatise of the System of the World/De mundi systemate entails that robust 
“action at a distance really takes place in nature.”49
these are, in a nutshell, the accounts that have been put on the table. In the next 
section, I shall argue, while drawing heavily on the draft versions of the Queries, 
that contrary to henry’s claims on the Queries, Kochiras’s claims on Query 21, and 
Schliesser’s claims on De mundi systemate, Newton never accepted robust action at a 
distance, and that all four of the above proposals have failed to take into account 
the relevant theological background, which informed and motivated his views on 
action at a distance. Newton used the term ‘action at a distance’ to refer to motion 
that is not produced “mechanically,” that is, by the direct contact between parts 
of matter. he conceived of two ways in which motion could be brought about 
non-mechanically: either the motion occurs without intervening substance or it 
occurs through the intervention of an immaterial substance. I shall argue that by 
distinguishing between (i) “robust action at a distance,” which, as explained above, 
I take to refer to the view according to which spatially separated bodies impress 
a force on one another without an intervening material or immaterial substance 
between them, and (ii) “non-mechanically mediated action at a distance,” which 
I take to refer to view according to which the “attractions” (or “repulsions”) 
between material bodies are produced by and mediated through a non-mechanical 
active principle 50—whatever that agent might ultimately be and however it might 
45 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 44–45. Although he did not address this 
issue in detail, Wilson seems to agree with this stance: “When Newton in the second english edition 
of his Opticks (1717) tentatively proposed an aethereal cause for gravity, his intent was not to avoid 
action-at-a-distance, but to show that he did not ‘take Gravity to be an essential Property of Bodies’; 
the particles of his aether mutually repelled one another” (“euler on Action-at-a-Distance,” 400).
46 Schliesser, “Newton’s Substance Monism,” 163[b]. 
47 Schliesser, “Newton’s Substance Monism,” 163[b]–64[a].
48 Schliesser, “Newton’s Substance Monism,” 163[b].
49 Schliesser, “Without God,” 85.
50 throughout this essay I rely on Newton’s own understanding of gravity’s cause being non-
mechanical, according to which gravity is not produced by the direct contact between pieces of 
matter, but by “some other cause than dense Matter” (Newton, Opticks4, 369). In the General 
Scholium (1713), Newton listed the desiderata that the cause of gravity, whatever it might 
be, should be meet: “Indeed, this force [of gravity] arises from some cause that penetrates as far as 
the centers of the sun and planets without diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the 
quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion 
to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing 
as the squares of the distances” (Newton, The Principia, 943; my italics). Newton was convinced 
that a dense material fluid that acts by direct contact could not meet these three desiderata. 
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ultimately operate upon matter—we can account for the prima facie conflicting 
fragments in Newton’s writings, and, additionally, for the conflicting views on his 
views on action at a distance in the current literature. My claim is not that Newton 
himself explicitly signaled the above distinction to his readers; rather, my claim is 
that, if we study Newton’s usage of ‘action at a distance’ in different contexts, we 
find that he is using ‘action at a distance’ in two distinct senses, which are captured 
adequately by the distinction I have introduced above. More precisely, I shall 
first argue that in his fourth letter to Bentley Newton was rejecting robust action 
at a distance. Afterwards, I highlight that Newton in the Queries to the Opticks 
systematically used the phrase ‘action at a distance’ to refer to non-mechanically 
mediated action at a distance. Although as we will see Newton identified a non-
mechanical ether as the cause of gravity in the Queries to the Opticks, he never 
explained how it operates upon matter.
3 .  n e w t o n ’ s  v i e w s  o n  a c t i o n  a t  a  d i s t a n c e
In the following subsections, I address the three issues that I have put on the agenda 
at the outset of the second section. correspondingly, in 3.1, I shall contextualize 
Newton’s 1692/93 letter to Bentley; in 3.2, I shall address the significance of 
Newton’s “active principles” vis-à-vis the passivity of matter; and, finally, in 3.3, I 
shall explicate Newton’s views on action at a distance in the Queries.
3.1. “ . . . as it must if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus”
One of the loci classici for the scholarly debate on Newton’s views on action at a 
distance is his letter to Richard Bentley on 25 february 1692/93. elsewhere I 
have argued in considerable detail for my own interpretation of this important 
letter.51 here I will repeat the gist of my interpretation, but, at the same time, I will 
strengthen it. In his famous fourth letter to Bentley, Newton wrote the following:
Tis inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, should (without ye mediation of something else 
wch is not material), operate upon & affect other matter wthout mutual contact; as it must if 
gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential & inherent in it. And this is one reason 
why I desired you not to ascribe innate gravity to me. that gravity should be innate 
In Query 28 Newton explained that, on account of having vis inertiae, a mechanical ether—how-
ever small its particles may be—would offer notable resistance to the motions of the celestial 
bodies and he pointed out that, in view of the regular and unperturbed motions which the 
celestial bodies actually describe, it is manifest “that the heavens are void of all sensible Re-
sistance, and by consequence of all sensible Matter” (Newton, Opticks4, 365). correspondingly, 
Newton rejected attempts to feign “[h]ypotheses for explaining all things mechanically [i.e. 
hypotheses based on direct contact]” and concluded that “[a] dense Fluid can be of no use for 
explaining the Phænomena of Nature, the Motions of the Planets and comets being better 
explain’d without it. It serves only to disturb and retard the Motions of those great Bodies, 
and make the frame of Nature languish: And as it is of no use, and hinders the Operations 
of Nature, and makes her languish, so there is no evidence for its existence, and therefore it 
ought to be rejected” (Newton, Opticks4, 368–69; my italics). Given the above context it is clear 
that in Newton’s view a mechanical ether is a material one, which acts by direct contact, and 
that a non-mechanical ether is an immaterial one. correspondingly, when I use the terms 
‘mechanical’ or ‘non-mechanical’ throughout this essay, I consistently refer to the meaning 
which Newton himself attributed to them.
51 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 42–44.
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inherent & essential to matter so yt one body may act upon another at a distance 
through a vacuum wthout the mediation of any thing else & by & through wch their 
action and force may be conveyed from one to another is to me such an absurdity 
that I beleive no man who has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of 
thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly 
according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial is a question I 
left to ye consideration of my readers.52
from the above quotation, it is clear, at least prima facie, that Newton introduced two 
important terms: that of ‘mediation,’ at the very start of the above quotation, and 
that of ‘agency,’ at the end of the quotation. One might be tempted to conclude 
that Newton was discussing one and the same thing, so that the first occurrence 
of ‘mediation’ and ‘agency’ denote the same thing. Accordingly, Kochiras has 
concluded that “Newton states his own view in the first sentence [namely, his 
inclination toward the view that the agent, i.e. the secondary cause, producing 
gravity is immaterial53], while in the last he describes what he did in the Principia, 
which was to refrain from stating his own view [regarding the secondary cause 
producing gravity],”54 and that Newton was “not using the [first occurrence of the] 
term ‘mediation’ to denote God or divine action,”55 but referring to his “inclination 
to the principle of local causation.”56 there is, however, contextual evidence 
suggesting that with the first occurrence of ‘mediation,’ Newton was referring to 
divine providence and that with ‘agency’ he was referring to the secondary cause 
of gravitation. the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from Newton’s 
fourth letter to Bentley states, “the last clause of your second Position I like very 
well.”57 the clause from Bentley’s letter on 18 february to which Newton referred 
to goes as follows: “[Sir, I make account, yt your courteous suggestion by your Last, 
yt a chaos is inconsistent with ye hypothesis of innate Gravity, is included in this 
paragraph of mine.] and again, tis inconceivable, yt inanimate brute matter should 
(without a divine impression) operate upon & affect other matter without mutual 
contact: as it must be, if gravitation be essential and inherent in it.”58 Kochiras 
insists, however, that 
[i]f Newton meant to refer to God or God’s action then, an easier and far clearer 
way of doing so would be to use one of those phrases or better yet, simply to retain 
Bentley’s quite precise phrase, “divine impression.” Instead, he replaces Bentley’s 
clear and precise phrase with one that appears nowhere else in the correspondence: 
“ye mediation of something else wch is not material.” this phrase is imprecise, since 
there are things other than God which are not material—minds, for instance, and 
perhaps also some immaterial aether.59
however, in view of Newton’s statement, which immediately precedes the 
quotation from the fourth letter to Bentley and which Kochiras does not signal 
52 Newton, Correspondence, III.253–54; italics and underscores added.
53 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 181n109.
54 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 268n5.
55 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 180[a].
56 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 181[a].
57 Newton, Correspondence, III.253.
58 Newton, Correspondence, III.249.
59 Kochiras, “Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 180[b].
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to her readers, that “ye growth of new systems out of old ones wthout ye mediation 
of a divine power seems to me apparently absurd,”60 Kochiras’s claim is rather 
unconvincing. Instead, it seems more likely that “ye mediation of something else 
wch is not material” simply refers to “ye mediation of a divine power.” Divine 
providence was one of the focal points of the Newton-Bentley correspondence, 
and it should not be a surprise that it crops up in the fourth letter to Bentley.61 
In his first letter to Bentley (10 December 1692), for instance, Newton pointed 
out that the regular motion of the planets is “the effect of counsel.”62 Similarly, 
in his second letter to Bentley (17 January 1692/93), he emphasized that “gravity 
may put ye planets into motion but without ye divine power it could never put 
them into such a circulating motion as they have about ye Sun.”63 however, the 
reference to God’s mediation does not imply that Newton conceived of God as 
the direct cause of gravity. from his statement “but whether this agent be material 
or immaterial is a question I left to ye consideration of my readers” it is clear he 
thought that gravity requires a secondary cause or agent, for he would surely not 
ascribe the predicate ‘material’ to God.64 Newton endorsed the view according to 
which God made and governs the world “by his Agents”—thereby implying that 
God’s agents act as secondary causes.65
there are additional problems for Kochiras’s interpretation: her claim that 
“Newton states his own view in the first sentence, while in the last he describes what 
he did in the Principia, which was to refrain from stating his own view” implies that 
Newton would have been inclined toward a non-mechanical cause of gravitation 
by 25 february 1692/93. however, as I have argued elsewhere, this seems rather 
unlikely, for Newton came to entertain a non-mechanical account of gravitation 
as the most likely candidate for explaining gravity only by May 1694, that is, by the 
time he showed his so-called “classical Scholia” to David Gregory.66 By May 1694, 
Newton came to emphasize that spatially separated bodies do not gravitationally 
attract one another unless some moving active principle intercedes—note that in 
Newton’s thought ‘active principles’ always referred to non-mechanical secondary 
causes.67 By that time he came to reject the only mechanical explanation of gravity 
that he had, shortly after the publication of the first edition of the Principia, 
considered as a plausible candidate to explain gravity: the mechanical ether that 
fatio De Duillier introduced in 1690 and which consisted of ether particles in swift 
random motion that are so small that the mutual collisions of these particles could 
60 Newton, Correspondence, III.253; my italics.
61 the opening sentence of Newton’s first letter to Bentley reads, “When I wrote my treatise 
about our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with considering men for the 
beleife of a Deity & nothing can rejoice me more then to find it usefull for that purpose”  (Newton, 
Correspondence, III, 233).
62 Newton, Correspondence, III.235.
63 Newton, Correspondence, III.240.
64 cf. henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 13[b].
65 cuL Add. Ms. 3965, 368v [post-1713]. In Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 
41–42, I argue that there is no clear-cut evidence in the classical Scholia or in later documents that 
suggests that Newton thought of God as being the direct cause of gravity.
66 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 38–43.
67 cuL Add. Ms. 3965, 269r [ca. 1694].
685newton on  a cti o n  a t  a  d i stan c e
be ignored.68 In other words, at the time of the composition of the fourth letter 
to Bentley Newton still left open the possibility that gravity could be explained by 
some sort of material secondary cause. In manuscript material composed before 
the fourth letter to Bentley, Newton noted that De Duillier’s hypothesis is the only 
one “by which gravity may be explained mechanically [per quam gravitas explicetur 
mechanicè].”69 Only later, that is, in the General Scholium and in the Queries to 
the Opticks, would Newton openly deny that gravity can be explained mechanically.
consequently, it seems that, while the first occurrence of ‘mediation’ in the 
quotation refers to his belief that an immaterial primary cause, that is, God, 
regulates the secondary cause of gravity, ‘agency’ refers to the secondary cause 
that is the vehicle of gravitational interaction. In the first sentence of the quotation 
from his fourth letter to Bentley, Newton was not, as Kochiras claims, reporting 
on his views on the agent or secondary cause producing gravity. In the fourth 
letter to Bentley, he preferred not to address this matter and restricted himself 
to pointing out that gravity’s secondary cause, whether material or immaterial, is 
dependent on God’s counsel. 
Let us now proceed to a different matter. What was it that Newton was rejecting 
in his famous letter to Bentley? yet again, there currently is no consensus on this 
matter. henry states that Newton was not rejecting action at a distance, but only 
the claim that gravity is essential to matter.70 According to Janiak, Newton’s denial 
“that gravity could be essential to matter does not itself foreclose the possibility 
that material bodies might exhibit distant action.”71 In what follows, I argue that 
Newton’s denial that gravity is essential to matter, on the one hand, and his 
rejection of robust action at a distance, on the other, cannot be separated. In 
order to do so, I shall explicate what Newton—in the context of his of discussions 
of action at a distance—meant by the claim that gravity is essential to bodies.
Janiak argues that, while for Newton the claim that gravity is essential to matter 
entails the claim that material bodies act on one another at a distance, the converse 
does not hold.72 the claim that bodies act on one another at a distance does not 
entail the claim that gravity is essential to matter, for “two otherwise lonely bodies 
at some spatial separation from one another might act in that fashion [i.e. at a 
distance], but lose their property of gravity through some arbitrary increase in 
their spatial separation, thereby rendering the property merely accidental (Newton 
himself notes that gravity cannot be essential to matter because it decreases with an 
increase in spatial separation—Principia, 796).”73 In his commentary to Rule III, to 
which Janiak refers, Newton stated, furthermore, that inertia is essential because 
it is immutable.74 Janiak in other words is contrasting essential versus accidental 
qualities, in the following way: while inertia is an immutable-universal quality, 
68 Rosenfeld, “Newton’s Views on Aether and Gravitation,” 33. See furthermore fatio de Duillier, 
“De la cause de la pesanteur.”
69 cuL Add. Ms. 4005, 28r [ca. 1690–93].
70 henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 12[b].
71 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35.
72 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35–36n51.
73 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 36n51; my italics.
74 Newton, The Principia, 796.
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that is, a universal quality that cannot be increased and diminished, gravity is an 
accidental-universal quality, that is, a universal quality that can be increased and 
diminished. It is this distinction that seems to underlie Janiak’s argument: for if 
gravity is a universal quality that can be increased and diminished, then, in the 
above scenario, action at distance is compatible with gravity being an accidental 
quality of matter and, therefore, action at a distance does not imply the claim that 
gravity is essential to matter. While I agree that the above distinction provides a 
useful (albeit partial) explication of Rule III,75 which Newton introduced in the 
second edition of the Principia (1713), that is, 20 years after the composition of 
his fourth letter to Bentley, I tend to disagree, however, that the above explication 
of how Newton understood the claim that gravity is essential to matter is the 
relevant one for understanding the fourth letter to Bentley (and the Queries). 
When discussing action at a distance, Newton attributed a different meaning to 
what it means for gravity to be essential to matter.
for Newton the claim that gravity is essential to matter is, in the context of his 
fourth letter to Bentley and the Queries, equivalent to the claim that bodies do 
not require a divinely regulated secondary cause for their motions (for further 
argumentation and contextualization, see 3.2).76 If gravity is essential to bodies 
in this sense, then the gravitational attraction between spatially separated bodies 
results not from the agency of a secondary cause, but from a quality that is 
“inherent”77 to matter itself. Gravity being essential to bodies implies that matter 
itself acts as a source of motion and activity. Note that if gravity is inherent to matter, 
then, since gravitational attraction does not require a secondary cause, bodies act 
on one another at a distance in a robust sense, and, vice versa, if bodies robustly act 
on one another across a vacuum, that is, without the intervention of a secondary 
cause, then gravity is inherent to matter. therefore, in contrast to what henry, 
Janiak, and Kochiras argue,78 Newton’s denial of epicurean attraction cannot be 
separated from his rejection of robust action at a distance. Rather, given the above 
interpretation, by writing that it is “inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, 
should (without ye mediation of something else wch is not material), operate upon 
& affect other matter wthout mutual contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense 
of epicurus, be essential & inherent in it,” Newton was signaling that robust action 
at a distance is equivalent to the claim that gravity is essential to matter: robust 
75 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 114–18.
76 In his first letter to Bentley, Newton denied that gravity is independent from God’s counsel 
by stressing that “[I]ts plaine that there is no natural cause wch could determine all ye Planets both 
primary and secondary to move ye same way & in ye same plane wthout any considerable variation. 
this must be the effect of counsel. . . . to make this systeme therefore wth all its motions, required 
a cause wch understood & compared together the quantities of matter in ye several bodies of ye Sun 
& Planets & ye gravitating powers resulting from thence, the several distances of the primary Planets 
from ye Sun & secondary ones from Saturn Jupiter & ye earth, & ye velocities wth wch these Planets 
could revolve at those distance about those quantities of matter in ye central bodies. And to compare 
& adjust all these things together in so great a variety of bodies argues that cause to be not blind & 
fortuitous, but very well skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry” (Newton, Correspondence, III.232–35).
77 Newton, Correspondence, III.240.
78 henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione,” 13[a]; Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35; and, Kochiras, 
“Gravity’s cause and Substance counting,” 173[a].
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gravitational action at a distance simply is epicurean attraction. In manuscript 
material composed in 1694, Newton pointed out that the epicurean mode of 
explaining the frame of nature in terms of matter and void alone leads to atheism: 
“In distinguishing all of nature in either body or void space the epicureans have 
entirely denied God, but this is excessively absurd. Because two planets separated 
from each other by a long distance do not act on each other by the force of gravity 
or in any other way except but by some moving active principle which intercedes 
between them and by which the force is transmitted from the one to the other.”79 
According to Newton, the epicureans reject God by neglecting the secondary causes 
through which God governs the physical world and by failing to include active 
principles in their basic ontology. In 3.2 I will elaborate on Newton’s theological 
reservations against epicurean action at a distance and strengthen the above 
analysis. In order to do so, I shall discuss Newton’s views on the passivity of matter, 
but first we will review yet another account.
3.2. “ . . . other laws of motion unknown to us”
Schliesser claims, on the basis of his interpretation of some pieces of text that are 
taken from Newton’s posthumously published A Treatise of the System of the World/
De mundi systemate (first published in 1728; composed ca. 1685),80 that Newton’s 
fourth letter to Bentley “does not rule out the existence of (properly reconceived) 
matter as an active agent or cause of gravity.”81 the way to reconceive matter 
properly, according to Schliesser, is to think of gravity as a relational interaction 
force between pairs of bodies: 
A way to capture this is to say that a body has two dispositions: a “passive” disposition 
to respond to impressed forces is codified in the second law of motion whereas an 
“active” disposition to produce gravitational force is treated as a distinct interaction 
codified in the third law of motion. thus, we see that the “cause” of the action is “the 
conspiring nature of both” bodies. for the “conspiring” to occur, the bodies must 
share a “nature.” . . . to sum up: the cause consists in the “nature” or “disposition” of 
two bodies (or a twofold cause because involving two bodies), but it is one interaction 
or “nature.”82 
79 Epicurei naturam totam in corpus et inane distinguentes Deum pernegarunt: at absurde nimis. Nam 
Planetæ duo ab invicem longo vacui intervallo distantes non vi gravitatis neque ullo modo agent in se invicem 
nisi movente principio aliquo activo quod utrumque intercedat & per quod vis ab utroque in alterum propagetur 
(cuL Add. Ms. 3965, 269r [1694]; my translation).
80 for some important observations on this treatise, see Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural 
Philosophy,” 30n147. Readers of A Treatise of the System of the World/De mundi systemate should be aware 
that there are significant differences, which were introduced during the editing process, between the 
text of De mundi systemate and the manuscript, i.e. cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 1r–56r on which it is based, on 
the one hand, and between A Treatise of the System of the World and De mundi systemate, on the other. In 
view of this, straightforwardly inferring Newton’s views from A Treatise of the System of the World/De mundi 
systemate is precarious without establishing that certain statements occur in the original manuscript 
as well. In general De mundi systemate is more reliable than A treatise of the system of the world, but the 
ultimate arbiter is of course cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 1r–56r.
81 Schliesser, “Without God,” 91; my underscore.
82 Schliesser, “Without God,” 85; cf. 80 and 86. I agree that gravity was for Newton a relational 
interaction force (Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 30–34, 116, and 118), but I 
deny that it entails the activity of matter.
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thus construed, Schliesser takes it that Newton’s account in De mundi systemate 
entails “a very clear description of action at a distance; applying the third law of 
motion is not merely a mathematical statement, but action at a distance really takes place 
in nature.”83
Does Schliesser’s account correspond to Newton’s view on the matter around 
1685, and does it correspond to the views Newton developed afterward?84 Before 
I address this question, I would like to make some observations on Schliesser’s way 
of contextualizing De mundi systemate. Schliesser claims that “the Treatise is more 
speculatively metaphysical than the published version of Book III” and he observes 
that “Newton knows that it is a kind of speculative metaphysics or hypothesis that he 
deplores with increasing vehemence in others as he anticipates and gets embroiled 
in debates with the Mechanical philosophers and later the vituperative, politicized 
exchanges with Leibniz and his followers.”85 Let us take a look at what Newton 
wrote on De mundi systemate at the beginning of Book III of the Principia. he wrote,
On this subject I composed an earlier version of book 3 in popular form [methodo 
populari], so that it might be more widely read. But those who have not sufficiently 
grasped the principles set down here will certainly not perceive the force of the conclusions [vim 
consequentiarum minime percipient], nor will they lay aside the preconceptions [præjudicia] to 
which they have become accustomed over many years; and therefore, to avoid lengthy disputations 
[& propterea ne res in disputationibus trahatur], I have translated the substance of the earlier 
version into propositions in a mathematical style [more mathematico], so that they may be read 
only by those who have first mastered the principles [qui principia prius evolverint].86
he indicated himself that De mundi systemate is foremost a popular version of Book 
III. In the above quotation, he explained why he had refrained from publishing 
this popular version. the concern that he raised is methodological: those who have 
not mastered the physico-mathematical treatment of Book I will “certainly not 
perceive the force of the conclusions,” and therefore (propterea) in the Principia he 
decided to physically treat of the forces in the systema mundi only after providing 
his physico-mathematical treatment of centripetal forces. there is no hint at all 
that Newton withheld the publication of De mundi systemate during his lifetime 
because he considered it to be “speculatively metaphysical.” the reason why he 
withheld it was because, contrary to his own methodological standards, in De mundi 
systemate the physico-mathematical treatment of force, which is vital for Newton’s 
non-hypothetico-deductive inference of the inverse-square centripetal forces in the 
system of the world,87 was not clearly as demarcated from the physical treatment of 
force as in the Principia. Both treatments in De mundi systemate were, in fact, blended. 
Schliesser could then argue that at the outset of Book III of the Principia Newton was 
clever enough not to hint at the “speculatively metaphysical” contents of De mundi 
83 Schliesser, “Without God,” 85; my italics.
84 Schliesser obviously claims that the answer to the first question is positive. Although he does 
not make any claims on Newton’s later views, he does claim that the above interpretation sheds light 
on Newton’s fourth letter to Bentley (“Whithout God,” 81–83) and on Newton’s Queries (“Newton’s 
Substance Monism,” 163[b]). I reject both of these claims.
85 Schliesser, “Without God,” 81 and 84.
86 Newton, The Principia, 793; my italics; Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis, II.549.
87 Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” chapters 2 and 3.
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systemate and to resort, instead, to a methodological sounding statement. In order 
to accept this move, however, it should first be shown that Newton’s statements 
in De mundi systemate were indeed “speculatively metaphysical.” Since there is no 
independent evidence that supports Schliesser’s account, his account can only be 
adequate if and only if his textual interpretation of De mundi systemate is adequate. 
Let us look at the text on which Schliesser bases his account:
for all action is mutual, and makes the bodies mutually to approach one to the other,88 
and therefore must be the same in both bodies. It is true that we may consider one 
body as attracting another as attracted. But this distinction is more mathematical 
than natural.89 the attraction is really common of either to other, and therefore of 
the same kind in both.90 . . . And though the mutual actions of two Planets may be 
distinguished and considered as two, by which each attracts the other; yet as those 
actions are intermediate, they don’t make two, but one operation between two terms.91 
two bodies may be mutually attracted, each to the other, by the contraction of a cord 
interposed. there is a double cause of action, to wit, the disposition of both bodies, 
as well as a double action in so far as the action is considered as upon two bodies.92 
But as betwixt two bodies it is but a single one. . . . By the action with which the Sun 
attracts Jupiter, Jupiter and the Sun endeavour to come nearer together [by the 
third Law of Motion]93 and by the action, with which Jupiter attracts the Sun, likewise 
Jupiter and the Sun endeavour to come nearer together. But the Sun is not attracted 
towards Jupiter by a two-fold action, nor Jupiter by a two-fold action towards the Sun: 
but ’tis one single intermediate action, by which both approach nearer together. . . .  
In this sense it is that we are to conceive one single action to be exerted betwixt two 
Planets, arising from the conspiring natures of both.94
Although the words ‘arising from the conspiring natures of both’ might be 
suggestive, should we really endorse the conclusion that, when properly reconceived, 
the “conspiring natures” of material bodies should be properly conceived of “as an 
active agent or cause of gravity” for Newton, or is it more plausible that Newton had 
written these words in a sense that was—in the spirit of what he himself considered 
88 At this point, the translator omitted ‘(per Motus Legem 3.)’ (Newton, De mundi systemate, 25; 
cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 14r).
89 the original reads Considerari potest corpus unum ut attrahens, alterum ut attractum, sed hæc distinctio 
magis mathematica est quàm naturalis (cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 14r). Although Newton granted that we may 
consider the mutual attraction between a pair of bodies as two-fold so that each body separately attracts 
the other, physically speaking it is to be considered as “one operation between two terms,” as Newton 
clarified in the remainder of the quotation. correspondingly, in this context ‘natural’ refers to ‘physical.’
90 the original reads, Attractio reverà est corporis utriusque in utrumque, atque adeo ejusdem generis in 
utroque (cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 14r).
91 the original reads, Et quamvis binorum Planetarum actiones in se mutuò distingui possint ab invicem 
ut actiones binæ quibus uterque trahit alterum considerari: tamen . . . quatenus intermediæ sunt non sunt binæ 
sed operatio simplex inter binos terminos (cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 14r).
92 the original reads, Causa actionis gemina est, nimirum dispositio utriusque corporis; actio item gemina 
quatenùs in bina corpora: at . . . quatenùs inter bina corpora simplex est et unica (cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 14r–15r).
93 the reference to Law III was added in the 1737 edition of A Treatise of the System of the World and 
was originally contained in cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 15r.
94 Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World, 38–40. the last sentence in the original reads, Ad hunc 
modum concipe simplicem exerceri inter binos Planetas ab utriusque conspirante naturâ oriundum operationem; 
& hæc eodem modo se habebit ad utrumque: adeò proportionalis existens materiæ in uno eorum, proportionalis 
eris materiæ in altero (cuL Add. Ms. 3990, 15r).
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to be a popular treatment—rather loose, and without aiming at “speculatively 
metaphysical” conclusions? I will argue that the latter is the most likely. In the 
above quotation, Newton concluded that “we are to conceive one single action to 
be exerted betwixt two Planets, arising from the conspiring natures of both.” his 
main point here is that gravity is an interaction force and that mass is one of the 
causally salient variables in the production of gravitational effects. In the above 
quotation there is no hint whatsoever that he considered matter, when properly 
reconceived, as an active agent. Moreover, there are further problems: Schliesser’s 
account is incompatible with the methodological beliefs that Newton held at the 
time of the composition of De mundi systemate. Schliesser attributes to Newton 
the view that “applying the third law of motion is not merely a mathematical 
statement, but action at a distance really takes place in nature”—here he, yet again, 
imposes an interpretation that is not grounded in the text. to ascribe to Newton 
what I have called robust action at a distance, is to miss out on significant features 
of his methodology, namely his desire in De mundi systemate to remain neutral with 
respect to defining “a species or mode of action, or a physical cause or reason 
[modum actionis causamve aut rationem physicam].”95 It is also incongruent with 
Newton’s theological reservations against robust action at a distance. Schliesser’s 
account is, more specifically, incompatible with his views on the passivity of matter. 
In discussing Newton’s ‘active principles’ in what follows, my purpose is not to 
document all extant manuscript material in detail, but instead to point to the 
significance of the active principles within the context of the Queries of the Opticks.
By 1694 Newton became convinced that, like many other natural phenomena, 
gravitational interaction requires the activity of certain non-mechanical active 
principles. the significance of Newton’s changes of mind cannot be overestimated. 
Before 1694 he had conceptually differentiated the gravitational ether, which he 
took to work mechanically, from the vegetative ethers, which he considered to be 
caused by active spirits.96 Given the affinities that Newton came to see between 
gravitational and vegetative processes, it should not come as a surprise that both 
kinds of processes played a crucial role in the Queries to the Opticks. According 
to Newton, vegetative processes are indicative of the fact that, besides vis inertiae 
and the “passive laws of motion arising from them,” there are also “very potent” 
laws of motion in nature:
[Nod↓w↓ all these ↓the above mentioned↓97 motions are too ↓so↓ great & violent to 
cause ↓to be↓ as to shew that ↓in fermentations↓ there is new motion in the world 
95 Newton, Mathematical Papers, VI.97. In order to show that at a date close to the composition of 
cuL 3990, ff. 1r–56r (1685) Newton already subscribed to the views that he would reiterate later in the 
text to Definition VIII in the first edition of the Principia (1687) (Newton, The Principia, 408), I have 
here deliberately quoted from the initial revise of De motu (Winter/early Spring 1684–85). furthermore, 
there are clear indications that Newton thought that De mundi systemate contained no speculations 
or hypotheses on the cause of gravitational interaction. Newton wrote, for instance, that he wanted 
“to avoid all questions about the nature or quality of this force, which we would not understood to 
determine by any hypothesis” (Newton, A Treatise of the System of the World, 4; cuL Add. Ms. 3990, f. 2r).
96 Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius, 100–103. 
97 Newton was referring to processes of fermentation here.
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generated from other Principles then the usual laws of motion.] Now the above 
mentioned motions are so great & violent as to shew that in fermentations bodies 
↓wch rest↓almost↓ rest↓ are put into ↓new↓ motions by a much more potent principle 
that↓en↓ those laws of motio the Vis ine the laws of motion & the Vis inertiæ of the 
matter [& that by this principle new motions] & ↓very potent ↓active↓ Principle 
Principle wch is much more potent then the↓ which acts upon bodies ↓them↓ only 
when they approach one another, [illegible word] [& wch is much more potent then 
are the pass passive laws of motion arising from the Vis inertiæ of the matter.]98 
According to Newton, bodies are intrinsically passive and are moved only by active 
principles, that is, non-mechanical agents: “for we meet very little Motion in the 
World, besides what is owing to these active Principles,” as Newton declared in 
Query 31 of the Opticks.99 “the Vis inertiae,” he stated, “is a passive Principle by 
which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, . . . By this Principle alone there never 
could have been any Motion in the World. Some other Principle was necessary for 
putting Bodies into Motion [i.e. an active principle]; and now they are in Motion, 
some other Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion.”100 “And if it were 
not for these [active] Principles,” Newton wrote in corresponding manuscript 
material, “the bodies of the earth, Planets, comets, Sun, & all things in them 
would grow cold & freeze & become inactive masses, & all putrefaction generation 
vegetation & life would cease, & the Planets the Planets & comets would not 
remain in their Orbs.”101 In an unpublished manuscript sheet, which was part of 
Newton’s preparations for the second edition of the Principia, Newton recorded 
that the most wise order of things could not have arisen “from matter alone and 
motion or from the nature of things [a materia sola et motu aut a rerum Natura].”102 
Newton argued that God regulates the natural world by means of certain “active 
Principles,” which cause—inter alia—gravitation, fermentation, and cohesion.103 
correspondingly, in an unpublished draft version of what was to become Query 
31, he wrote,
Whence it seems to have been an ancient opinion that matter depends upon a Deity 
for its ↓laws of↓ motion as well as for its existence. The Cartesians make God the author of 
all motion & its as reasonable to make him the author of the laws of motion. Matter is a passive 
principle & cannot move it self. It continues in its state of moving or resting unless disturbed. 
It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it. And resists as much as it is resisted. 
These are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against experience. for 
we find in or selves a power of moving our bodies by or thought ↓Life & thinking 
↓will↓ are active Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of 
motion unknown to us↓.104
the above remarks square nicely with Newton’s denial that motion results from 
qualities that are inherent to matter itself and with his belief that for their motions 
98 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 244r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
99 Newton, Opticks4, 399.
100 Newton, Opticks4, 397; my italics.
101 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 282r; my italics. cf. 621v [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)] and Newton, 
Opticks4, 399–400.
102 cuL Add. Ms. 3965, 152v.
103 Newton, Opticks4, 401.
104 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 619r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
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bodies require divinely governed secondary causes, which serve as the immaterial 
sources of activity and motion. As we have seen in 3.1, gravity being inherent to 
matter implies that bodies can act as a source of motion and activity. Newton, 
however, denied that gravity is inherent to extended regions of impenetrable 
space that exhibit the usual essential inertial properties and obey the three laws 
of motion. As Newton wrote in Query 31,
It seems to me farther, that these Particles have not only a Vis inertiæ, accompanied 
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that force [i.e. the three 
laws of motion], but also that they are moved by certain active Principles, such as is 
that of Gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of Bodies.105
for Newton robust action at a distance entailed the activity of matter, and the 
latter is what he explicitly rejected by asserting that “matter is a passive principle & 
cannot move it self.” In other words, Newton rejected robust action at a distance, 
because it leads to a theological conclusion that he could not accept: that matter 
by itself is active and does not depend on God’s secondary causes for its motions. 
In line with his theological concerns, he saw his gravitational theory as providing 
room for the active principles, which he conceived of as indications of matter’s 
dependence on God for its motions.
Given the above context, it is clear that the “elastick” medium, which Newton 
introduced in Query 21 as a possible explanation for gravity, cannot be other than 
non-mechanical.106 Suppose for a moment that the elastic medium that Newton 
introduced in Query 21 provides a mechanical explanation of gravity, according 
to which gravity is produced by the direct contact between pieces of matter.107 
If this were the case, then in the Queries Newton would have been involved in a 
rather surprising inconsistency: on the one hand, he sought to establish that gravity 
requires a non-mechanical active principle, which is installed and maintained by 
God, and, on the other hand, he introduced a mechanical explanation of gravity. 
the gravitational ether that Newton introduced in Query 21 is supposed to “contain 
Particles which endeavour to recede from one another.”108 to account for gravity 
hypothetically, he introduced a gravitational “Æther” or “Medium,” which is “much 
rarer within the dense Bodies of the Sun, Stars, Planets and comets, than in the 
empty celestial Spaces between them” and which “in passing from them to great 
distances,” grows “denser and denser perpetually, and thereby cause the gravity 
of those great Bodies towards one another, and of their parts towards the Bodies; 
every Body endeavouring to go from the denser parts of the Medium towards 
the rare.”109 At this point, Newton added that “though this Increase of density 
may at great distances be exceeding slow, yet if the elastic force of this Medium 
105 Newton, Opticks4, 401.
106 Newton, Opticks4, 350–52. Despite all this, when discussing the Queries, Schliesser contends 
that “[t]his [i.e. Newton’s discussion of the active principles in nature] allows, as he explicitly says in 
his Letter to Bentley, that the attractive ‘agent be material.’ If attractive agents can be material then 
for Newton matter need not always be passive” (Schliesser, “Newton’s Substance Monism,” 163[b]).
107 See n. 50.
108 Newton, Opticks4, 352.
109 Newton, Opticks4, 350.
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be exceeding great, it may suffice to impel Bodies from the denser parts of the 
Medium towards the rarer, with all that power which we call Gravity.”110 Although 
the minute particles111 of the elastic or, as Newton wrote in corresponding 
manuscript material, “active”112 ether are indeed material, the inter-particulate 
repulsive forces between them act non-mechanically. In other words, the medium 
that he introduced in Query 21 consists of extremely small material bodies that are 
spatially separated, on the one hand, and the non-mechanical active principle that 
produces and mediates the repulsive forces between those bodies, on the other. 
Note that by calling the ether ‘active,’ he was distinguishing it from a mechanical 
ether. In Query 28 he argued that a mechanical medium is to be rejected:
And therefore to make way for the regular and lasting Motions of the Planets and 
comets, it’s necessary to empty the heavens of all Matter, except perhaps some very 
thin Vapours, Steams, or effluvia, arising from the Atmospheres of the earth, Planets, 
and comets, and from such exceedingly rare Æthereal Medium as we described 
above [i.e. in Query 21]. A dense fluid can be no use for explaining the Phænomena 
of Nature, the Motions of the Planets and comets being better explain’d without 
it. It serves only to disturb and retard the Motions of those great Bodies, and make 
the frame of Nature languish: And in the Pores of Bodies, it serves only to stop the 
vibrating Motions of their Parts, wherein their heat and Activity consists. And as it is 
of no use, and hinders the Operations of Nature, and makes her languish, so there 
is no evidence for its existence, and therefore it ought to be rejected.113
Instead, gravity is to be attributed “to some other cause than dense Matter” and 
in the search for the cause of gravity a ban should be put on “feigning hypotheses 
for explaining all things mechanically.”114 As we have seen above, in Query 31 
he was contrasting the passivity of matter with the activity of the immaterial 
active principles, which included “the cause of Gravity.”115 Newton’s conviction 
that “matter is a passive principle & cannot move it self” applies to the material 
constituents of the ether which he introduced in Query 21 as well. therefore, the 
ether does not consist of active matter, rather it consists of material particles that 
are moved by an active principle. 
Given the above context, it seems that the medium which Newton introduced in 
Query 21 involves non-mechanically mediated action at a distance. his introduction 
of the ether of Query 21 harmonized perfectly with his endeavor to show that 
non-mechanical active principles testify of God’s providential plan.116
110 Newton, Opticks4, 351.
111 Newton concluded his discussion of Query 21 by pointing to its explanatory benefits: “the 
exceeding smallness of its Particles may contribute to the greatness of the force by which those Particles 
may recede from one another, and thereby make that Medium exceedingly more rare and elastick 
than Air, and by consequence exceedingly less able to resist the motions of Projectiles, and exceedingly more able to 
press upon gross Bodies, by endeavouring to expand it self” (Newton, Opticks4, 352; my italics).
112 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 261v and 263r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
113 Newton, Opticks4, 368.
114 Newton, Opticks4, 369.
115 Newton, Opticks4, 399.
116 Newton, Opticks4, 400–402. It is clear that Newton was inclined to believe that this ether hy-
pothesis may account for the celestial motions which suffer no sensible resistance. Whether the ether 
hypothesis introduced in Query 21 may indeed in its technical details account for such motion is 
another matter, which I shall not further address here.
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As we have seen, Newton was convinced that denying active principles was “to 
speak against experience.” Why was it so important for Newton to establish God’s 
providential plan by drawing upon experience? the answer is that at the time of the 
composition of the Queries which appeared in later versions of the Opticks/Optice, 
Newton became convinced that “in proving a Deity all a[r]guments ↓not↓ taken 
from Phænomena are little better then dreams.”117 In similar vein, he wrote as 
follows:
↓Even arguments for a Being [i.e. God] if not taken from Phænomena are slippery & serve 
only for ostentation.↓ An Atheist will allow that there is a Being absolutely perfect, 
necessarily existing & the author of all th manking↓d↓ & call it Nature: & if you 
talk of infinite wisdom ↓or of any perfection more then ↓he allows to say[?]↓ in 
natur[?]↓ heel ↓reccon at a chemæra &↓ tell you that you have the notion of ↓finite 
or↓ limited wisdom from what you find in yor self & are able without ye [illegible 
word] of your self to add ↓prefix[?]↓ ye word ↓not↓ & to understan ↓or more yn to 
any verb or adjective &↓ without the existence of wisdome not limited ↓or wisdome 
more then finite↓ to understand the meaning of the sentence phrase words phrase 
as easily as Mathematicians understand the p what is meant by an infinite line or an 
infinite area.118
Accordingly, in the Queries that were published in later edition of the Opticks/
Optice, Newton set out to demonstrate God’s existence from phenomena.119 this 
sheds light on Newton’s claim that “if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing 
this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will 
be also enlarged. for so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first 
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty 
towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature.”120
Before concluding this section I would like to end with an observation. 
In Query 28, Newton had emphasized that the philosophers of Greece and 
Phoenicia tacitly attributed “Gravity to some other cause than dense Matter,” 
“↓or mechanism↓,” as he added in corresponding manuscript material.121 his 
reference to the ancients in the Queries to the Opticks and their corresponding 
manuscript material122 might be taken to imply that, after the composition of the 
“classical Scholia,” Newton immersed himself once again in a detailed study of 
the views of the ancient philosophers. As far as we can tell, however, there is no 
indication of this whatsoever. In the published versions and in their corresponding 
manuscript material we do not find a single reference to or quotation from an 
ancient source. Moreover, there is only one fragment in which Newton mentioned 
some “celebrated Philosophers” by name:
117 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 622r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
118 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 619r ; my italics [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
119 It is useful to contrast Newton’s latter approach in demonstrating the existence of God with 
his earlier approach, which was based on logical conceivability (e.g. Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius, 
266). Since, as I have already explained, it presently is not my aim to treat the theological portions of 
the Queries in their own right, I shall refrain from further discussion. 
120 Newton, Opticks4, 405; my italics.
121 Newton, Opticks4, 369; cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 246r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
122 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 246r–247r, 249bisr, 254v, 270r, 289r, 291r–292v, and 619r. 
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And for rejecting such a Medium we have ↓also↓ the authority of those the oldest & 
most celebrated Philosophers of Greece & Phenicia, ↓(Mochas, Phirecides, thales, 
Pythagoras↓ who made a Vacuum, Atoms & the gravity of Atoms the first principles 
of their philosophy [end of text].123
this suggests that, when he was composing the Queries that appeared in later 
editions of the Opticks, Newton was not embarking in a new series of studies of 
the ancients sources, but simply reaffirming what he took to be the implications 
of his earlier studies on the matter.
If the account that I have spelled out above is correct, then, contrary to Janiak 
and Kochiras, Newton’s main concern with robust action at a distance was not that 
it violated his endorsement of or inclination toward the principle of local action, 
but rather that it lead to the absurdity of active matter. from the above line of 
reasoning it is also clear that, contrary to Janiak, Newton did not connect his denial 
of robust action at a distance with God’s ubiquity, but rather with his conviction 
that robust or epicurean attraction leads to certain atheistic implications that he 
was unprepared to accept.
3.3. “ . . . that something in space void of matter”
In this subsection, I would like to elaborate on Newton’s usage of ‘action at a 
distance’ in the Queries to the Opticks. I argue that Newton’s usage in the Queries 
can be explicated by what I have called “non-mechanically mediated action at a 
distance.”
there are a total of 8 occasions in the Opticks124 and 22 in the draft material 
of the Queries125 in which Newton explicitly referred to action at a distance. 
the interpretation that I shall defend is explanatory of all 30 aforementioned 
occurrences. Despite Newton’s rejection of what I have called robust action at 
a distance, in the Queries to the Opticks Newton ascribed ‘actions at a distance’ 
to a variety of phenomena. Prima facie his usage of ‘action at a distance’ in the 
Queries seems to suggest that Newton was prepared to accept robust action at a 
distance to account for various optical processes, as henry claims, and that in the 
context of the non-mechanical gravitational ether that he introduced in Query 21, 
he entertained the possibility of robust action at a distance between its mutually 
repelling particles, as henry and Kochiras claim. can one account for this apparent 
contradiction? I think one can, because in the Queries to the Opticks Newton was 
talking about non-mechanically mediated action at a distance only. 
123 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 289r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)]. Newton referred to thales and 
Pythagoras in the classical Scholia (Royal Society Gregory Ms. 247, 6r–14v). there he did not, however, 
mention Mo(s)chus of Sidon or Pherecydes of Syros.
124 to wit: 1 occurrence in Proposition VIII, Book II, Part III (Newton, Opticks4, 266); 1 occurrence 
in Proposition XIV, Book II, Part III (283); 1 occurrence in Query 1 (339); 3 occurrences in Query 
29 (371); and 2 occurrence in Query 31 (376 and 395–96).
125 to wit: 2 occurrences on cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 234r-v; 1 occurrence on 241v; 3 occurrences on 
248r; 1 occurrence on 254r; 3 occurrences on 257r; 2 occurrences on 271r; 1 occurrence on 273r; 1 
occurrence on 281r; 2 occurrences on 289r; 1 occurrence on 291r; 2 occurrences on 292r-v; 1 occur-
rence on 299r; 1 occurrence on 477v; and, finally, 1 occurrence on 619r.
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In Query 31, Newton queried as follows: “have not the small Particles of Bodies 
certain Powers, Virtues, or forces, by which they act at a distance . . . ? for it’s well 
known, that Bodies act one upon another by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism, 
and electricity; . . .”126 here, it seems that Newton was invoking robust action at a 
distance. Given his theological observations against epicurean attraction, which 
I have brought to the fore in 3.2, it seems very unlikely that he was: postulating 
robust actions at a distance between the minute particles of the Query 21 ether 
would entail that the repulsions between those particles are essential to them. 
Once Newton had launched Query 31, in line with the scholium to Section XI of 
Book I of the Principia,127 he underscored the following:
how these Attractions may be perform’d, I do not here consider. What I call Attraction 
may be perform’d by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me. I use that Word here 
to signify only in general any force by which Bodies tend towards one another, 
whatsoever be the Cause. for we must learn from the Phænomena of Nature what Bodies 
attract one another, and what are the Laws and Properties of the Attraction, before 
we enquire the cause by which the Attraction is perform’d.128
In corresponding manuscript material, Newton wrote in a crossed-out fragment: 
“But while I call these forces attraction or repulse, I would not be understood to 
define the cause or manner of action.”129 here, it seems, he was referring to his 
methodological endeavor to remain neutral with respect to the cause of gravity. his 
neutrality with respect to the cause entails neutrality with respect to robust action 
at a distance.130 William L. harper has correctly emphasized that, in a demonstrative 
context, Newton wished to remain neutral with respect to action at a distance: 
“Newton did not let any philosophical commitment to avoid action at a distance 
undermine his methodological commitment to make theory mediated measurements 
afford empirical answers to questions about the force of gravity and the masses, 
interactions and motions among solar bodies.”131 Accordingly, harper concludes 
that, from a methodological perspective, the applications of Law III to distant 
motion[s] “do not carry any weight to support action at a distance for Newton.”132 
his methodological endeavor to remain neutral with respect to the cause of gravity, 
however, also entails neutrality with regard to non-mechanically mediated action 
at a distance and, yet, this is precisely the hypothesis that he entertained in the 
Queries. While it is definitely correct that he did not introduce a full-blown cause 
for gravity in the Queries, for he did not stipulate a mode of action for the active 
principle that produces the repulsive forces of the Query 21 ether, and he admitted 
that he did “not know what this Æther is,”133 he nevertheless speculated that 
gravity is produced by non-mechanical and divinely mediated active principles—
126 Newton, Opticks4, 375–76.
127 Newton, The Principia, 588–89; cf. 408. In the scholium to Section XI of the Principia, Newton 
had made it clear that by the word ‘attraction’ he was not defining a mode of action or a physical cause 
and that ‘attraction’ refers to whatever endeavour of bodies to approach one another.
128 Newton, Opticks4, 376; my italics.
129 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 254r, cf. 620v [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717–18)].
130 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 35n49.
131 harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 367.
132 harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method, 368.
133 Newton, Opticks4, 352.
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regardless of how these principles ultimately operate. from the Queries, it is in 
other words clear that in a speculative context Newton speculated freely and broke 
with the methodological neutrality that he endorsed in a demonstrative context. 
In a speculative context, he rejected, for the theological reasons I have spelled 
out, robust action at a distance and endorsed non-mechanically mediated action 
at a distance. Newton, however, carefully separated what he thought could be 
demonstrated from phenomena and what he thought could not and, accordingly, 
he did not present his ether speculations as demonstrations, but as queries.134
Let us now look at the following statement:
Qu. 17 Is there not something in↓di↓ffused through all space in & through wch bodies 
move without resistance & by means of wch they act upon one another at a distance in 
harmonical proportion of their distances.135
I would like to emphasize that this is definitely not at all an isolated occurrence: 
the drafts to the Queries contain several, nearly identical variants.136 On several 
occasions, Newton phrased variants of the above question in terms of “what is 
the means by which bodies act upon one another at a distance?” his way of phrasing 
this question is important, for it shows that he was dismissive of robust action at 
a distance and that he was implying that, in order to “act at a distance,” bodies 
require the mediation of an immaterial substance. In another variant, he wrote, 
“can any space be wthout something ↓in it↓ & what is that something in space 
void of matter [& what are its properties & operations on matter]?”137 In related 
manuscript material, he clarified what he understood by a vacuum: “By a Vacuum I 
do not mean a space void of all substances.”138 correspondingly, although a vacuum 
is devoid of matter, it contains non-material substances such as active principles, 
spirits and the like. When drawing attention to the analogy between the optical, 
magnetic and gravitational “spirits,” he concluded as follows:
Do not all bodies abound with uncertain ↓a very subtile active vibrating↓ spirit by wch 
light is emitted reflected & refracted, electric & magnetic attractions ↓& fugations↓ 
are performed, the contiguous ↓small↓ particles of bodies cohære when contiguous, 
& agitate [illegible word] one another at ↓small↓ distances & regulate ↓almost↓ 
all their motions amongst themselves as the great bodies of the universe regulate 
theirs by the power of gravity? For electric bodies could not act at a distance without a spirit 
reaching to that distance.139
the implications of the above draft material are that Newton was indeed endorsing 
the view that “action at a distance” is mediated by non-mechanical agents. What 
the above and related manuscript material shows is that in the Queries he used 
‘action at a distance’ to refer to what I have called “non-mechanically mediated 
action at a distance.” his usage of ‘action at a distance’ in the Queries did not at all 
commit himself to robust action at a distance. Instead, he emphasized that “action 
134 cf. Ducheyne, “The main Business of Natural Philosophy,” 283.
135 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 234v; my italics [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
136 these are to be found on cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 261r, and 291r [drafts prepared for Opticks 
(1717)].
137 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 291r.
138 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 621r [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
139 cuL Add. Ms. 3970, 241v; my italics [drafts prepared for Opticks (1717)].
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at a distance” is produced by a non-mechanical secondary cause that mediates 
between gravitationally interacting bodies. to take Newton’s usage of ‘action at 
distance’ in the Queries in a robust sense is to disregard his theological concern 
that, by admitting robust action at a distance, gravity would be essential to matter 
and it is to neglect also his intention to provide room for divinely mediated “active 
principles” within the realm of nature.
By now I have argued that one should distinguish between two different senses 
of ‘action at a distance.’ Moreover, I have argued that both senses can clearly be 
found in Newton’s work and that by distinguishing between them one can account 
for all prima facie conflicting fragments in Newton’s corpus. Put differently, I have 
argued that the distinction between robust and non-mechanically mediated action 
at a distance is explanatory of Newton’s usage of ‘action at a distance.’
4 .  c o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have argued that Newton, when discussing action at a distance, used 
‘action at a distance’ in two distinct senses: while in his fourth letter to Bentley 
Newton was rejecting robust action at a distance, in the Queries he was using 
‘action at a distance’ to refer to non-mechanically mediated action at a distance, 
which was compatible with his desire to point to the theological significance 
of certain non-mechanical active principles. I have also explicated Newton’s 
understanding of the claim that gravity is essential to matter and argued that 
Newton’s rejection of robust action at a distance cannot be separated from his 
rejection of epicurean attraction. furthermore, I have clarified that he rejected 
robust action at a distance because of its theologically unacceptable implications: 
that matter is active and requires no divinely mediated secondary causes for its 
motions. finally, I have shown that, although Newton did not stipulate a modus 
operandi for the inter-particular repulsive forces of the Query 21 ether, he broke 
with the methodological principle of neutrality with respect to the cause of gravity, 
which he consistently put to practice in a demonstrative context, by invoking the 
hypothesis of non-mechanically mediated action at a distance.
Kochiras has correctly noted that Newton ran into the fundamental problem 
of showing how his preferred non-mechanical medium could be established by 
empirical means.140 the non-mechanical ether, which Newton introduced in Query 
21, is indeed beset with insurmountable methodological problems. the relevant 
question is, however: should we, in order to understand what Newton was doing in 
the Queries to the Opticks, judge the contents of the Queries by those criteria that 
he considered to be crucial in the demonstrative part of natural philosophy? In 
my view, we should not, for it is clear that the speculative nature of the Queries 
was patently different from the demonstrative ethos of the Principia. Since in the 
Queries Newton was speculating instead of demonstrating, it should not come as 
much of a surprise that he did not live up to the methodological standards that 
he endorsed when demonstrating.
140 Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance counting Problem,” 277[b]–79[a].
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Moreover, by judging Newton’s Queries only from a methodological perspective, 
we might fail to see what he conceived of as being the raisons d’être of Queries 
21 and 31. In the introduction I have emphasized that from the 1706 edition of 
Optice and onwards the Queries or Quaestiones not only served Newton’s endeavour 
to stimulate future research, but that, at the same time, they began to serve his 
theological agenda as well. It was in his 1706 Optice that Newton launched the 
theological ethos that would become characteristic of his 1713 General Scholium, 
as Stephen D. Snobelen has aptly reminded us.141 Although from a methodological 
perspective Query 21, which was introduced in the 1717 edition of the Opticks, was 
surely vexed by methodological problems, Newton found it important enough to 
make it public. Why did he hazard this methodologically precarious hypothesis? 
Was it to stimulate future inquiry—although he was clearly aware that it would 
be extremely difficult to demonstrate the veracity of his hypothesis? Or could 
it be that Newton was convinced that Query 21 was important enough to make 
public for different reasons? the answers to these questions can be found in 
the already mentioned advertisement to the 1717 edition of the Opticks. there 
Newton declared, “At the End of the Third Book I have added some Questions. And 
to shew that I do not take Gravity for an essential Property of Bodies, I have added one 
Question concerning its Cause, chusing to propose it by way of a Question, because I am 
not yet satisfied about it for want of Experiments.”142 from its context it is clear that 
Newton was referring here to Query 21. In the above advertisement, Newton was 
explicit about why Query 21 was so important to him: because he wanted to show 
that he did not take gravity for an essential property of bodies. In my opinion, 
showing that gravity is not essential to matter and that it requires non-mechanical 
active principles, which are governed by God, was for Newton such “a duty of the 
highest moment”143—especially in view of his growing belief that arguments for 
the existence of God should be drawn from phenomena—that he was prepared 
to set aside his highly sophisticated methodological standards and to indulge in 
revealing aspects of his theological agenda.
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